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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to June 13, 1966, it was the law of the United States that,
before the confession of a suspect in a criminal trial could be in-
troduced into evidence, the trial court must ascertain that that con-
fession was voluntarily given, i.e., the trial judge must determine
that in obtaining the confession, the interrogators did not deprive
the suspect of his or her rights without due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment-the "voluntariness" standard. On June 13,
1966, the rule was changed by the United States Supreme Court in
t Associate Professor of Law at St. Thomas University School of Law.
2465
1
Maloy: Can a Rule Be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Miranda v. Arizona.' In that case the Court decided that for a con-
fession to be admissible at trial, the suspect, before interrogation,
must have been warned by the interrogators that he or she (1) has
a right to remain silent, (2) that any statement that the suspect
does make may be used against him or her, and (3) that he or she
has a rijht to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed. The Miranda Court said that "[w] e encourage Congress
and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly ef-
fective ways of protecting the rights of individuals while promoting
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws."' In 1968, Congress ac-
cepted the Court's invitation, and enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501. That
statute overruled Miranda,5 and returned the nation to the volun-
tariness standard for confessions made while the suspect is in cus-
tody.6 The three specific warnings required by the Miranda deci-
sion were not required, but if they were given, they were simply
factors to be considered by the courts in determining whether or
not the confession was "voluntarily" made.7
1. 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). The case was argued on February 28, March 1,
and March 2, 1966.
2. Id. at 468-73. Two years prior to deciding Miranda, the Supreme Court
decided Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), which held inadmissible
certain statements made by an accused in patent ignorance of the law, despite his
having retained counsel. Id.
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
4. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
Part II, Tit. II, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 210 (amending Pub. L. No. 90-578, Tit. III, §
301 (a) (3), 82 Stat. 1115). See also Daniel Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in
Federal Prosecutions: Implementation of Section 3501 By Law Enforcement Officials and
the Courts, 63 GEO. L.J. 305, 311-312 (Nov. 1974) (reporting that PresidentJohn-
son expressed reservations about the statute's constitutionality at the time he
signed it).
5. Not unlike Congress' overruling of N.L.t.B. v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 516
(1984), by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, 11 U.S.C. § 1113, and other instances of Congress' reaction to its dis-
pleasure with particular judicial decisions. Senate Report 1097 clearly reveals
Congress' dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's Miranda decision. S. REP. No.
90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. "The committee is convinced
from the mass of evidence heard by the subcommittee ... that the rigid and in-
flexible requirements of the majority opinion in the Miranda case are unreason-
able, unrealistic and extremely harmful to law enforcement." Id. Congress left no
doubt that it thought that by enacting § 3501 it was righting a wrong committed
by the Supreme Court. Id. "The committee is of the view that the legislation pro-
posed in section 701 of tide 1I would be an effective way of protecting the rights of
the individual and would promote efficient enforcement of our criminal laws." Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(d) (1968). The statute does not apply unless the person
is "under arrest or other detention." Id.
7. Other factors were listed, which actually expanded upon the pre-Miranda
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Despite this change in the rules as to confessions, law en-
forcement agencies followed the 1966 law (as determined by the
Miranda case), and generally ignored the 1968 statute-§ 3501.
The reason for this anomaly is that the Supreme Court never had
occasion to rule on the applicability or constitutionality of the stat-
ute in a case or controversy brought before it. The Department of
Justice, taking the position that the statute is unconstitutional, did
not assert it; criminal defendants, preferring that the admissibility
of their confessions be tested by the requirements laid down in
Miranda, rather than by the less stringent requirements of the stat-
ute, understandably likewise did not assert it.
Though the Supreme Court had not ruled on the constitu-
tionality or applicability of the statute, in 1994, Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court, proclaimed, by dictum, that 18 U.S.C. § 3501
is "the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal
prosecutions. Therefore, as this pronouncement makes clear,
unless and until 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was declared unconstitutional, it
remained the supreme law of the land.9
On February 8, 1999, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Dickerson,10 held in a split (2-1) decision, that "the
admissibility of confessions in federal court is governed by 18
U.S.C. § 3501 ... , rather than Miranda."" The court en banc (8-5),2
declined to rehear the case. On December 6, 1999 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the decision in
Dickerson. The case was argued on April 19, 2000 and decided on
June 26, 2000-the Court declaring the statute unconstitutional in
Dickerson v. United States.'4 Most news analysts saw the Court's job as
"voluntariness" test. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Miranda Remediated, 3 GREEN BAG
2D 149, 153-54 (Winter 2000).
8. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 351 (1994). Justice
O'Connor noted Justice Thomas' position in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,
457 (1994). Id. See also United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.
1975) (proclaiming the same thing nineteen years earlier).
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
10. 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999).
11. Id. at 695.
12. For reasons best known to it, the full complement of the court must have
thought the matter well established. Id. In United States v. Leong, No. 96-4876,
1997 VAL 351214, at *2 (4th Cir. June 26, 1997), the court appeared about ready
to address it, but opted not to do so since the D.O.J. failed to raise the issue. Id.
13. Dickerson v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 578, 578 (1999).
14. 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000). At the time of publication,
United States Reporter page citations were unavailable. Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court Reporter will be referenced in this article.
2001] 2467
3
Maloy: Can a Rule Be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
being whether to retain Miranda, rather than to determine the
constitutionality of a statute.' 5 The thirty-two years which it took
the Court to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not the
record for such delay. It seems that the 122 years represented by
Regan v. Time, Inc.,'6 is the longest that an unconstitutional federal
statute was on the books before it was struck down by the Supreme
Court.
17
What makes the decision particularly curious, is the alignment
of Justices and the ratio decidendi of the Court's opinion. The pre-
sent United States Supreme Court is reputedly composed of a lib-
eral wing, a conservative wing, 19 and two "swing votes, "20 who often
vote with the conservatives. 2' The seven-to-two Dickerson decision,
while not exactly turning that appraisal into a shibboleth, certainly
reflected agreement among some often divergent "wings." The so-
called liberal wing remained inviolate, but the conservative wing
22was fractured, with one of its members, not only joining the liber-
als, but authoring the seven member opinion of the court, made so
by the joinder of the two "swing votes." This alignment came as a
23surprise.
15. E.g., Linda Greenhouse, Miranda Decision Has Its Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2000; Brian Knowlton, Supreme Court Affirms Suspects' Right to Keep Silent,
INT'L HERALD TRIB. 10,June 27, 2000.
16. 468 U.S. 641, 643 (1984).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 474, enacted February 25, 1862, prohibited certain reproduc-
tion of United States currency. Id. On July 3, 1984, the Supreme Court held it
unconstitutionally flawed. Other instances of the time delay are: United States v.
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995) (6 years), Sable Com-
munications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989) (1 year), Hode v. Ir-
ving, 481 U.S. 704, 706 (1987) (4 years), and Alaska Airlines, Inc., v. Brock, 480
U.S. 678, 680 (1987) (9 years).
18. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens.
19. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
20. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor.
21. Perhaps for the lack of a better description, one could define the "liber-
als" as those who are primarily concerned with protecting the rights of individuals,
whereas the "conservatives" are more concerned with assuring that the system will
be maintained.
22. ChiefJustice Rehnquist.
23. Even the three Fourth Amendment cases decided this year gave no indi-
cation. The fact-intensive Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000), which con-
cerned a "Terry Stop," was decided along the five-to-four split. Id. In Florida v.
JL., 529 U.S. 266, 272-74 (2000), all Justices ruled that a purely anonymous "tip"
does not authorize a "Terry Stop." Id. Only Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334,
338-39 (2000), could portend a realignment. There the decision turned on the
question of whether a bus passenger could expect that personal baggage, placed
by him in an overhead rack, might be felt in an exploratory manner by a fellow
passenger, giving rise to a "reasonable expectation" that similar exploration might
2468 [Vol. 27:4
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What makes Dickerson perhaps even more unusual, and in fact
totally unexpected, is not the realignment, but the ratio decidendi of
the decision. The Court's judgment is a holding to the effect that
28 U.S.C. § 3501 is unconstitutional. The Court assigns only one
reason for that conclusion-Congress lacked the power to enact it
because the Supreme Court decision which Congress sought to
overturn, Miranda v. Arizona, 4 was a constitutional one. "Congress
may not legislatively supersede [Supreme Court] decisions inter-
preting and applying the Constitution."25
This case therefore turns on whether the Miranda Court
announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its
supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence
of congressional direction .... [W]e hold that Miranda,
being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be
in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline
to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that
Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissi-
bility of statements made during custodial interrogation
in both state and federal 
courts.
While acknowledging that "there is language in some of our
opinions that supports the view" that Miranda was a constitutional
decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist listed three reasons why it was a
mistake for the Fourth Circuit to conclude otherwise: (1) Miranda
and two of its companion cases applied its rule to state court cases;
(2) the Supreme Court has allowed prisoners to bring habeas cor-
pus proceedings based on Miranda violations;2 and (3) the fact
that the Miranda Court invited "legislative action to protect the
constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination.
be conducted by a law enforcement officer. Id. Seven members thought that
such deductions were reasonable. Id. at 335. Justice Breyer dissented, writing an
opinion in which Justice Scaliajoined. Id. at 339 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
25. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000); accord City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-521 (1997).
26. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
27. Id. at 2329-30.
28. Id. at 2333.
29. Id. at 2333 n.3. Habeas corpus proceedings may be brought only under
(a) the United States Constitution, (b) laws, or (c) treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1948). The Court concluded that since the Miranda rules are
clearly not based on federal laws or treaties, "our decision [s] allowing habeas re-
view for Miranda claims obviously assumes that Miranda is of constitutional ori-
gin." Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
30. Id. at 2333-35.
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After a brief discussion of each of the three grounds in sup-
port of the conclusion that Miranda was a constitutional decision
(which will be analyzed later in this paper), the Court considered
three arguments in favor of the Fourth Circuit's ruling: (1) excep-
tions to Miranda created by the Court; (2) amicus' argument that §
3501 is, in essence, a legislative alternative to Miranda; and (3) Jus-
tice Scalia's argument in dissent that the Dickerson holding is 'Judi-
cial overreaching."' 31 As a make-weight reason for invalidating the
statute (18 U.S.C. § 3501), the Court urged that Miranda should be
saved.32
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MIRANDA
The first ground for the decision in Dickerson is that Miranda is
"constitutionally based."33 After giving a brief history of the law
prior to the Miranda decision, ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote that in
Miranda "we laid down 'concrete constitutional guidelines for law
enforcement agencies and courts to follow.' 34
Congress has the sole power to enact "nonconstitutional" rules
of evidence and procedure that are binding on federal courts. The
Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the federal courts is lim-
ited to the power to prescribe such rules of evidence and proce-
dure that are "nonconstitutional."3 5 The Supreme Court does not
36have any supervisory power over the courts of the several states.
Only the Supreme Court has the power to Prescribe rules of evi-
dence or procedure that are constitutional. The Court listed six
factors in support of the main reason for its decision:
(1) "[B] oth Miranda and two of its companion cases applied
its rule to proceedings in state courts.
3 8
(2) "It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory
power over the courts of the several States."39
(3) "[W] e have allowed prisoners to bring alleged Miranda vio-
31. Id. at 2348.
32. Id. at 2335-36.
33. Id. at 2334.
34. Id. at 2331 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966)).
35. Id. at 2332.
36. Id. at 2333 (citing several Supreme Court decisions in support, except
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797-99 (1975)).
37. Id. at 2332.
38. Id. at 2328.
39. Id. at 2333.
2470 [Vol. 27:4
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss4/5
PROPHYLACTIC AND YET CONSTITUTIONAL?
lations before the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings."
40
(4) "[T] he majority opinion is replete with statements indicat-
ing that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional
rule.,,41
(5) "Many of our subsequent cases have also referred to
Miranda's constitutional underpinnings.
4
1
(6) "Additional support for our conclusion that Miranda is
constitutionally based is found in the Miranda Court's invitation for
legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced
self-incrimination."
Despite the above words, five44 of the seven member majority
in Dickerson have written about Miranda in words which clearly in-
dicate that they did not think that decision was a "constitutional"
one.45 Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor,
Scalia, Souter, and Stevens have all written about Miranda in such
terms as to leave little doubt that they consider that Miranda did• 41
not involve a construction of the Constitution.
In his first year as a Supreme Court Justice, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, authored the Court's opinion in Michigan v. Tucker:47
To supplement this new doctrine,48 and to help police of-
40. Id. at 2333 n.3.
41. Id. at 2334.
42. Id. at 2334 n.5.
43. Id. at 2334.
44. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter and
Stevens. Justice Scalia has also written in such terms.
45. Justice Tom Clark, one of the Justices who decided Miranda, thought the
decision was a constitutional one. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 500-03
(1966) (Clark, J., dissenting). He dissented because he thought the Court im-
properly invoked the Fifth Amendment in fashioning a "constitutional rule," and
would have preferred that the decision turn on the Due Process Clause. Id.
46. As pointed out in the brief filed by seventeen states and the Territory of
the United States Virgin Islands, the solution of this issue is important in that if
the Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights, law enforcement officers are
not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to give such warnings.
(Brief of Amici Curiae South Carolina et al. at 16, Dickerson v. United States, 120
S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (2000), available at 2000 WL 271989 [hereinafter "the States'
Brief"]. Perhaps "may not" would have been more appropriate than "are not."
See also Professor Alfredo Garcia, Criminal Law Symposium, Is Miranda Dead, Was
It Overruled, or is it Irrelevant, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 461, 485 (Spring 1998) (deal-
ing with the topic of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this excellent article).
47. 417 U.S. 433, 435 (1972).
48. He was referring to the Miranda Court's "for the first time, expressly de-
clar[ing] that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state interrogations
at a police station and that a defendant's statements might be excluded at trial
despite their voluntary character under traditional principles." Id. at 443.
2001] 2471
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ficers conduct interrogations without facing a continued
risk that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in
Miranda established a set of specific protective guidelines,
now commonly referred to as the Miranda rules. The
Court declared that 'the prosecution may not use state-
ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
4 9
"The Court recognized that these procedural safeguards were
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were in-
stead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-
incrimination was protected."
50
In Rawlings v. Rawlings,5' Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he
Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determin-
ing whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal
arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered."52 In
Duckworth v. Eagan,53 Chief Justice Rehnquist again referred to the
Miranda warnings as "procedural safeguards,"5 categorized them as
prophylactic, and noted that the Miranda Court recognized that
56they may be waived. So as to leave no doubt in the matter,
Rehnquist wrote, "[t] he Miranda rule is not, nor did it ever claim to
be, a dictate of the Fifth Amendment itself."57 In Michigan v. Har-
58vey, he wrote that "[this] Court has held that Miranda establishes a
prophylactic rule that 'sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself.'
59
In Ohio v. Robinette,6 Justice Ginsburg said that in Miranda the
Court announced a "minimal national requirement without sug-
gesting that the text of the Federal Constitution required the pre-
49. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
50. Id. at 444 (referring to Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
51. 448 U.S. 98, 100 (1980).
52. Id. at 107. He said that the "temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and particularly, the pur-
pose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. The voluntariness
of the statement is a threshold requirement." Id.
53. 492 U.S. 195, 197 (1989).
54. Id. at 201.
55. Id. at 203.
56. Id. at 202.
57. Id. at 209.
58. 494 U.S. 344, 345 (1990).
59. Id. at 362 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)).
60. 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996).
2472 [Vol. 27:4
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cise measures the Court's opinion sets forth. " 6 1 In South Dakota v.
Neville, Justice O'Connor referred to "prophylactic Miranda warn-
ings. " 6' In Oregon v. Elstad,6' she wrote that the "prophylactic"
Miranda warnings therefore are "'not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.' ' 64 In•65
Davis v. United States, Justice O'Connor wrote that "the right to
counsel established in Miranda was one of a 'series of recom-
mended 'procedural safeguards' ... [that] were not themselves pro-
tected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that
the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."
66
In a concurring opinion to the majority's opinion in Duckworth
67v. Eagan, Justice O'Connor wrote: " [t] he Miranda rule is not, nor
did it ever claim to be, a dictate of the Fifth Amendment itself. The
Miranda Court implicitly acknowledged as much when it indicate
that procedures other than the warnings dictated by the Court's
opinion might satisfy constitutional concerns."6 In a dissenting
opinion in Minnick v. Mississippi,69 Justice Scalia, (joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist), wrote:
In Miranda this Court declared that a criminal suspect has
a right to have counsel present during custodial interro-
gation, as a prophylactic assurance that the 'inherently
compelling pressures' ... of such interrogation will not
violate the Fifth Amendment. But Miranda did not hold
that these 'inherently compelling pressures' precluded a
suspect from waiving his right to have counsel present."7°
61. Id. at 43. "The Miranda exclusionary rule sweeps ... more broadly than
the Fifth Amendment itself." Id. (quoting Oregon v. Elstad 470 U.S. 298, 306
(1985)).
62. 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983).
63. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
64. Id. at 305 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). See
also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700-714 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, re-
ferred to the Miranda rules as "prophylactic." Id.
65. 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994).
66. Id. at 457 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974)). In
her opinion in Elstad, she referred to a "procedural Miranda violation." Elstad,
470 U.S. at 306.
67. 492 U.S. 195, 197 (1989).
68. Id. at 209.
69. 498 U.S. 146, 147 (1990).
70. Id. at 159 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). He added,
"[n]otwithstanding our acknowledgment that Miranda rights are 'not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution, but ... instead measures to insure that the
20011 2473
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In McNeil v. Wisconsin," Justice Scalia said that "we established
a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel .... ,,72
In Withrow v. Williams,7 Justice Souter wrote " [p] rophylactic
though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards 'a funda-
74 75mental trial right."' 74 In Davis v. United States, Justice Souter, in a
concurring opinion,76 rather than referring to the Miranda rules as
a constitutional mandate to be applied without any constraint, said
that "the justification for Miranda rules, intended to operate in the
real world, 'must be consistent with ... practical realities.'
77
78In Arizona v. Roberson, Justice Stevens referred to the "prophy-
lactic" protections of Miranda. In Evans v. United States, he wrote
that in Miranda, "this Court established a presumption of 'inher-
ently compelling' pressures in the context of official custodial in-
terrogaton."79
The word "prophylactic," which several of the Justices have
used to describe the Miranda rules, has virtually become a term of
art. Justice Brennan first used it in its usual meaning of being
right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected."' Id. at 160 (quoting
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444). He referred to Miranda's "prophylactic right to have
counsel present." Id. at 166.
71. 501 U.S. 171,173 (1991).
72. Id. at 176 (referring to the Courts' holding in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484-85 (1981)). He added, "In Miranda ... we established a number of pro-
phylactic rights designed to counteract the 'inherently compelling pressures' of
custodial interrogation, including the right to have counsel present. Miranda did
not hold, however, that those rights could not be waived." McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176.
In Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 179 (1990), Justice Scalia, in a concur-
ring opinion in which Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined, said that "[i] t is of
course absurd to interpret a criminal statute on the basis of one's perception as to
whether its 'spirit' has been violated; and doubly absurd to interpret a prophylactic
measure on the basis of whether the evil against which the prophylaxis was directed
in fact exists." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
73. 507 U.S. 680, 682 (1993).
74. Id. at 691 (quoting U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
He also wrote: "in Malloy, we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and thereby
opened Bram's doctrinal avenue for the analysis of state cases. So it was that two
years later we held in Miranda that the privilege extended to state custodial ar-
rangements." Id. at 689. He was referring to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2 (1964)
and Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
75. 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994).
76. Justice Souter was joined by Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg and Stevens.
77. Davis, 512 U.S. at 469 (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 468 U.S. 675, 688
(1988)).
78. 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988).
79. 504 U.S. 255, 290 (1992).
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something that prevents harm,80 in Kaufman v. United States,8 in
which he wrote: " [t]he exclusion of illegally seized evidence is sim-
ply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth
Amendment violations by law enforcement officers."8 The then
Justice Rehnquist, in California v. LaRue, referred to the rules of a
state agency as "prophylactic. 8 1 Over the years, several Justices
have used the word to describe rules of prevention in general84 and
the Miranda rules in particular.85 Justice Stevens in his dissent in
Michigan v. Harvey, took the majority to task for its use of the word
"prophylactic" when he wrote:
Apparently as a means of identifying rules it disfavors, the
Court repeatedly uses the term 'prophylactic rule' ... it is
important to remember, however, that all rules are pro-
phylactic ... An argument that a rule of law may be ig-
nored, avoided, or manipulated simply because it is pro-
phylactic is nothing more than an argument against the
rule of law itself.
8 6
A comparison of prior pronouncements of five of the present
Justices with their ruling in Dickerson, begs the question, can a rule
be prophylactic and at the same time constitutional? The Court
has not furnished us with an answer to that question. Justice Scalia,
in his dissent, sees the Court as acknowledging its use of the appel-
lation "prophylactic" (how could it do otherwise), but torturing
80. In Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 165 (1990), Justice Stevens
wrote, "Congress appropriately enacts prophylactic rules that are intended to pre-
vent even the appearance of wrongdoing .... "
81. 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Actually the first time the word appeared in Su-
preme Court opinions was in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413-14 (1962), in an
entirely different context.
82. Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 224.
83. 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972).
84. Chief Justice Burger, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 571 (1980), said that the open processes of justice serve an important "pro-
phylactic" purpose. Justice Blackmun, in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437
U.S. 298, 312-13 (1978), referred to an Internal Revenue Service rule as being
"prophylactic." Justice Marshall, in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 485 (1977), an anti-trust case, used the word in its usual parlance. Jus-
tice Stewart, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
364 (1977), said that Title VII was "prophylactic." Justice White, in Zauderer v. Of-
fice of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642-68 (1985), re-
ferred to rules of professional conduct as "prophylactic."
85. NewYork v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 681, 684 n.4 (1984) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Justice Powell, in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) and Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) used the term in connection with the Miranda rules.
86. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 368-69 (1990).
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that adjective into a license for the Court to "write a prophylactic,
extraconstitutional constitution, binding on Congress and the
States.",
7
III. STARE DECISIS
As a make-weight reason for its decision to invalidate the stat-
ute, the Court asserts that the case it sought to overrule (Miranda)
should be saved by stare decisis. "Whether or not we would agree
with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing
the issue in the first instances, the principles of stare decisis weigh
heavily against overruling it now."
88
The present Justices have written about stare decisis. Justice
Kennedy, in Hohn v. United States,89 quoted with approval Justice
Rehnquist's words in Payne v. Tennessee,90 that is "the preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and con-
sistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of
the judicial process."9' He added, "[w]e have recognized, however,
that stare decisis is a 'principle of policy' rather than an 'inexora-
ble command. ' '' ' Its justification "must rest upon the Court's ca-
pacity and responsibility to acknowledge its missteps. It is our duty
to face up to adverse, unintended consequences flowing from our
own decisions. "9 In the case of Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rail-
ways, he wrote: "time and time again, this Court has recognized
that 'the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to
the rule of law."
94
Justice O'Connor, in F/ores, referred to a certain case as a "re-
cent one" and added: "[a] s such, it has not engendered the kind of
reliance on its continued application that would militate against
87. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2346 (2000). Infra text ac-
companying notes 194-227 discussing the Supremacy Clause.
88. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
89. 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
90. 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
91. Id. at 827; Hohn, 524 U.S. at 251.
92. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 251. This principle harkens back to Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). Justice O'Connor quoted these words with approval in
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). Justice Thomas quoted these words
with approval. See United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs., Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856
(1996).
93. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 400
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94. 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).
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overruling it."95 She added that "stare decisis is a principle of pol-
icy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest deci-
sion, however recent and questionable, when such adherence in-
volves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope,
intrinsically sounder and verified by experience."96
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Payne v. Tennessee,97 has observed
that while it is not an "inexorable command," rather it is "a princi-
ple of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision."98 In Reno v. Bossier, Justice Souter observed that
Congress may supersede stare decisis with new legislation.9
It is, of course true, that stare decisis is a respected, and often
used principle of appellate law. In 1938, Justice Brandeis wrote in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. °° that "[s]tare decisis is usually the
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."10' Jus-
tice Scalia has recently opined that: "Indeed, I had thought that the
respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than decreases,
with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence,
and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity."
0 2
To say, however, that a statute should be declared unconstitutional
because a case should be saved, is an unusual use of stare decisis.
Two subsidiary questions in connection with whether Miranda
should be saved by stare decisis were not addressed by the Supreme
Court. First, what is left of Miranda worth saving; and second, does
Miranda fit within one of the exceptions to stare decisis that have
been created by the Court?0
3 It is not an "inexorable command."'
°4
95. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 548 (1997).
96. Id. at 547 (quoting from Justice O'Connor's decision in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995)).
97. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
98. Id. at 828.
99. 528 U.S. 320, 343 (2000). Justice Souter was joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg and Stevens. Id. Justice Kennedy in Hohn said that "Congress remains
free to alter what we have done." Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251
(1998).
100. 285 U.S. 393 (1938).
101. Id. at 406. Justice O'Connor quoted these words with approval in Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997), and in State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20
(1997).
102. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
103. The Court peripherally considered the exceptions to Miranda, in connec-
tion with answering one of the contentions made by the Fourth Circuit, but it did
not address that matter in connection with stare decisis. Dickerson v. United
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Is Miranda Worth Saving?-My colleague, St. Thomas Law
School Professor, Alfred Garcia, took the position in 1998, that
Miranda was dead. He wrote, "[i] n the more than three decades
since its genesis, the [Miranda decision has become] ... a relic of a
bygone era. 105 So as to leave no doubt as to his position, Professor
Garcia concluded his article by saying: "I propose that we do away
with Miranda altogether. In determining whether an incriminating
statement or confession is voluntary, that is, the product of a free
will and intellect, courts should apply the old voluntariness stan-
dard. 1 °6
IV. EXCEPTIONS To MRANDA
Even if Miranda were worth saving, would its ruling fall within
one of the exceptions to stare decisis?
A. The Public Safety Exception
,- 107
In New York v. Quarles, Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion
of the Court' °8 which found that the Miranda warnings need not be
given when the immediate safety of the public is at stake.' °9 In llIi-
nois v. Perkins,"0 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court,'
which found that the Miranda warnings are not necessary when the
suspect is unaware that he is talking to the police or their agents.'
2
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
104. Infra note 171 and accompanying text.
105. Alfred Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 461, 461 (1998). This article was quoted with approval by the
Fourth Circuit Dickerson majority. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 691.
106. Garcia, supra note 105, at 504. Professor Michael O'Neill thought that
there was a good chance that the Court would save § 3501. O'Neill, supra note 7,
at 149. One of his major tenets was that Congress accepted the Court's invitation
in Miranda, and then made its own factual determination of what was needed to
protect Fifth Amendment fights. Id. Whether or not one agrees with Professor
O'Neill, it would seem that the Court might have considered his position suffi-
ciently compelling to warrant consideration.
107. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
108. Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented, but the remaining
Justices (including Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia) joined. Id.
109. Id. at 651, 653.
110. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
111. Id. Justice Marshall dissented, but the remaining Justices (including
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Stevens of the present Court) either joined or
concurred.
112. Id. at294.
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B. The Constitutional Exception To Stare Decisis
Stare decisis has only limited application in the field of consti-
tutional law.' This principle has been recognized by ChiefJustice• 14. .115 -- 16 ,117
Rehnquist,14 and Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy,"
6 O'Connor,
1. 18 119 -- m- 120 ..
Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas. Justice Souter, however, con-
curring in Payne v. Tennessee, cautioned that "even in constitutional
cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always
required a departure from precedent to be supported by some
'special justification."".' Justice Scalia, writing about the in-state
service rule, said that "its validation is its pedigree,'12 but Justice
Stevens has cautioned that "pedigree does not ensure constitution-
ality.",
23
C. The Procedural Exception To Stare Decisis
Justice Kennedy said in Hohn v. United States,124 "[t]he role of
stare decisis ... is 'somewhat reduced ... in the case of a procedural
rule ... which does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior."'
113. Justice Douglas explained the reason in State of New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 590 (1946). Stare decisis, he said, is restricted "to those areas of the
law where correction can be had by legislation. Otherwise the Constitution loses
the flexibility necessary if it is to serve the needs of successive generations." Id.
114. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). He has been criticized for
recognizing this exception to stare decisis, particularly in five-to-four decisions
cases. Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Rule of a Deci-
sion's Vote, Age and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 82 GEO. L.J. 1689 (Apr. 1994).
115. United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 878 (1996) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Agostina v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
118. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (dissenting opinion joined by justice Tho-
mas provided "[w]hen ... a constitutional doctrine adopted by the Court is not
only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled application, I do not feel bound
to give it stare decisis effect-indeed I do not feel justified in doing so." See also
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
119. Kimelv. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
120. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 341 (1999). Justice Thomas has
agreed with Justice Rehnquist's caution regarding stare decisis in Payne v. Tennes-
see, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). See also Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. at 856.
121. 501 U.S. at 842.
122. Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).
123. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 n.20 (1999).
124. 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998).
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D. The "More Recent, Better Reasoned Decision" Exception To Stare
Decisis
A third exception has been applied where the principle under
consideration has been contradicted by more recent, better rea-
soned authority. This principle has been recognized by Justices", 125
Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
The Miranda decision is as famous as the Dred Scott decision.'26
Westlaw reports that as of April 10, 2000 it had been cited in judi-
cial decisions and in scholarly writings 27,677 times.127 Is that a suf-
ficient reason to keep it under the doctrine of stare decisis?128
When the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 2 9 overruled the venerable
Pennoyer v. Neff, the rule that Pennoyer stood for had been in exis-
tence for one hundred years; so there is precedent for overruling
long standing, often-cited, respected decisions.'3 ' It should not be
used, however, as a reason for declaring a statute unconstitutional.
E. Additional Issues
There are five issues which the Court either did not consider,
or insufficiently considered: (1) Should the Court have declined to
hear this matter as being moot?; (2) Is there a conflict between
125. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy's dissent in International Business
Machines, Corp. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. at 878. See supra note 118, re-
gardingJustices Scalia and Thomas.
126. McFarlane v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261 (1994). Leslie A. Lunney in The
Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 795 (Spring
1999) wrote that "Miranda and its warnings have become one of the better known
aspects of constitutional law, recited nightly in our living rooms as part of one
televised crime drama or another." Id.
127. This represents an increase of 132 times in a month. By March 10, 2000,
it had been cited 27,545 times.
128. The doctrine of stare decisis and the term of art "precedent" are appar-
ently so well known that the Court has defined neither. In Camps New-
found/Owtonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564, 636 (1997), Jus-
tice Thomas, in a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scaliajoined, noted that even though a case may be precedent it may not be enti-
tled to stare decisis. "Precedent" refers to a prior holding of a court, (be it man-
datory or persuasive) whereas stare decisis refers to a holding of a court in one's
own jurisdiction, which, for various and sundry reasons, should be followed. Id.
129. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
130. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
131. Cf Lunney, supra note 126, at 791 n.28. Professor Lunney's appraisal to
the effect that "a gradual evolution of constitutional doctrine would seem to be
generally preferable to the Court's frank reversal of a prior constitutional deci-
sion." Id.
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Miranda and the statute?; (3) Even if Congress had the authority to
enact the statute, did it exceed that authority in doing so?; (4) Does
the concept of federalism have any part in this decision; and (5)
Does the Supremacy Clause have any part in this decision?
1. Should The Court Have Declined To Hear This Matter As Being
Moot?
On its face, there was no contest. The defendant, Charles
Thomas Dickerson, who filed the petition, submitted a brief asking
that the judgment of the Fourth Circuit be reversed, 1 2 but so did
the United States, as Respondent.' Only the Court-appointed
amicus curiae asked that the Fourth Circuit be affirmed. Where
135no contest exists in a case, the courts usually dismiss it as moot.
In Davis v. United States, 136 the Supreme Court refused to consider a
possible implementation of § 3501 ' because the Department of
132. Brief for Petitioner at 46, Dickerson v. U.S., 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (2000),
available at 2000 WL 142076 (2000). This brief was filed by counsel for the Peti-
tioner, even though in the order granting the writ of certiorari the Court permit-
ted the Petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 578, 578
(1999).
133. Brief for Respondent at 50, Dickerson, available at 2000 WL 141075 (2000).
Seven amicus filed briefs in opposition to the judgment. See also Brief of Amicus
Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. at 14, available at
2000 WL 93449 (2000). This brief was in support of "neither party," but simply
asked the Court to uphold the constitutionality of U.S.C. § 3501 "on the basis of
[the Court's] post-Miranda precedents and sound judicial policy." Id.
134. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 50, Dickerson, available at 2000
WL 272005 (2000). See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335. The Supreme Court,
when it granted the writ of certiorari, invited University of Utah College of Law
Professor Paul G. Cassell to brief and argue the case as amicus curiae in support of
the judgment. Id. The Court's invitation was probably made because it realized
that if amicus were not appointed to support the judgment, there might not have
been a brief filed to that effect, the Department of Justice having taken the posi-
tion that § 3501 was unconstitutional. In addition to the Court-appointed, four-
teen other amicus filed briefs in support of the judgment.
135. In Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1974), the Supreme Court said
that an "actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review .... " Id. See also
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). A formal judgment, which is simply an
advisory opinion, will not be tolerated, and the Court will dismiss the appeal as
moot. Id.
136. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
137. In that case Justice Scalia said that he wanted to hear argument on the
applicability and constitutionality of the statute. He wrote:
I am entirely open to the argument that section 3501 does not mean
what it appears to say; that it is inapplicable for some other reason; or
even that it is unconstitutional. But I will no longer be open to the ar-
gument that this Court should continue to ignore the commands of sec-
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Justice refused to take a position on its applicability."' It would
seem that the Court in Dickerson would at least have commented
upon the mootness point, and perhaps added to the exceptions to
139
mootness.
2. Is There A Conflict Between Miranda And The Statute?
Despite the position taken by the States,'4° the Court said
that there was "obvious conflict" between the case and the stat-
141ute, without however, elucidating on the point. The question is
important, for if there were no conflict between the statute and the
case, both could remain intact. Elucidation on the point would
have been helpful. Under brief analysis it would seem that the
Court is correct in concluding that there is conflict.
The Court in Miranda said that an accused has a Fifth
Amendment right against being forced into incriminating himself.
The opinion, written by justice Berger, explicitly stated that " [T] he
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or incul-
patory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
,,142
secure the privilege against self incrimination.
The statute, on the other hand, returned to the law that was in
effect before Miranda, to wit: that a confession must be voluntarily
given. It explicitly states that "[i]n any criminal prosecution
tion 3501 simply because the Executive declines to insist that we observe
them.
Id. at 464. He observed that legal analysis of the admissibility of a confession
without reference to the provisions of § 3501 is equivalent to legal analysis of the
admissibility of hearsay without consulting the Rules of Evidence. Id. at 463.
138. As to the Government's failure to raise the issues, Justice Scalia said,
I agree with the Court that it is proper, given the Government's failure
to raise the point, to renderjudgment without taking account of section
3501. But refusal to consider arguments not raised is a sound prudential
practice, rather than a statutory or constitutional mandate, and there are
times when prudence dictates the contrary.
Id. at 464.
139. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.7
(1997).
140. States' Brief at 2, Dickerson, available at 2000 WL 271989 (2000). The
States' Brief has taken the position that there is no conflict between Miranda and
the statute. "The holdings of Miranda and the provisions of section 3501 may and
should be read together harmoniously as creating a rule which expresses a strong
preference for giving the Miranda warnings but without automatically requiring
the suppression of confessions which are voluntary but unwared." Id.
141. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000).
142. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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brought by the United States or by the district of Columbia, a con-
fession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given."
43
As securing the privilege against self incrimination, Miranda,
stated:
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
fully effective means are devised to inform accused per-
sons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are re-
quired. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effec-
tuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made volun-
tarily, knowingly and intelligently.'
44
The statute, conversely, takes into account "all the circum-
stances" of the case. It includes the "Miranda warnings," but merely
among several other factors to be utilized by the trial judge in de-
termining the issue of voluntariness. The statute provides as fol-
lows:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness
shall take into consideration all the circumstances sur-
rounding the giving of the confession, including ...
whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that
he was not required to make any statement and that any
such statement could be used against him ... whether or
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning
145of his right to the assistance of counsel ....
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned fac-
tors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be con-
clusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.'
6
The specific applicability of the statute, however, tends to es-
tablish a lack of conflict. The statute restricts its application to "any
criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the Dis-
trict of Columbia," whereas the case is not so limited in its applica-
tion; hence conflict is not apparent, unless one considers Tafflin v.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (a)(1968).
144. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (b)(1968).
146. Id.
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Levitt.14 7 Justice O'Connor, writing for an unanimous court,
148
noted that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts over federal causes of action, unless Congress gives that ju-
risdiction exclusively to the federal courts, or there is a "clear in-
compatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal inter-
ests."149 The Court in Tafflin found no intent on the part of
Congress to limit RICO civil suits to federal courts, even though
the statute in question, provided for civil actions "in any appro-
priate United States district court." She added that "the mere
grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a
state court from concurrent jurisdiction of a cause of action."'
Would an extrapolation of this principle cause the statute's rules to
apply to state criminal actions as well as federal ones, making the
conflict apparent? One might have expected that some of the Jus-
tices would call for further briefing before they resolved the con-
flict issue152--but none of them did. Was this because the decision
in the case would not have been different had conflict not been
found, 15 or because as Justice Scalia detected, the decision was an
147. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
148. Hence all present Justices, except Breyer and Ginsburg, agreed with Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion.
149. Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459-60.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) (2000).
151. Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 461.
152. One commentator has discovered a "Doctrine of Remand" among Su-
preme Court decisions. Nash E. Long, The "Constitutional Remand: "Judicial Review
of Constitutionally Dubious Statutes, 14 J.L. & POL. 667, 710 (1998). In Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1977),Justice Stevens, in a footnote to his concur-
ring opinion, wrote that he might have voted differently had Congress justified
the manner in which it distinguished between men and women in the Social Se-
curity Act. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring.) In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
857 (1988), Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, wrote that "the Okla-
homa statutes have presented this Court with a result that is of very dubious con-
stitutionality, and they have done so without the earmarks of careful consideration
that we have required for other kinds of decisions leading to the death penalty."
Id. (O'ConnorJ., concurring.) Such judicial positions demonstrate the need for
clarity that only further legislative attention can produce. In City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 565-66 (1997), Justice Souter would have dismissed the writ of cer-
tiorari unless the case which prompted congressional action in passing the statute
under review were further briefed. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting.) In that position
he was joined by Justices Breyer and O'Connor. Id.
153. It would appear that conflict would be found to exist if Miranda were a
constitutional decision, because in such event, whether the statute applied to fed-
eral proceedings only or to both federal and state proceedings, Miranda would
reach both the federal and the state proceedings. If Miranda was found to be a
non-constitutional decision and the statute was found to apply only to federal
proceedings, conflict would exist at the federal level. If Miranda was found to be a
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"agreed-upon result?" 54
3. Even If Congress Had Authority To Enact The Statute, Did It
Exceed That Authority In Doing So?
Congress may have the power to enact legislation, yet exceed
that power, resulting in the invalidity (unconstitutionality), of a
statute. In City of Boerne v. F/ores,155 the Supreme Court held that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) ,' was un-
constitutional since it exceeded Congress' power to enact it. The
statute was passed by Congress in an attempt to overrule Emp, ment
Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 5 not
unlike Congress' passage of § 3105 in an attempt to overrule
Miranda. Justice Kennedy, wrote the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Stevens, and
Thomasjoined. The object of the statute was to prohibit federal
and state "[g]ovemment[s] from 'substantially burden [ing]' a per-
son's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the
burden '(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental inter-
est; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that ... inter-
est.
,, 159
The Court could find no authorization for the statute. Justice
Kennedy made four salient points: (1) "Congress does not enforce
non-constitutional decision, and the statute were found to apply to both federal
and state proceedings, there would be only partial conflict, at the federal, but not
at the state level.
154. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
155. 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
157. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). That case held that the Free Exercise Clause did
not prohibit Oregon from applying its drug laws to the ceremonial customs of
employees and hence claimants were denied unemployment compensation for
work-related misconduct based on the use of the drug. Id.
158. Justice Scalia did not join in Part III-A-1 of the opinion, which stated that
"[t]he power to interpret the constitution in a case or controversy remains in the
Judiciary." Flores, 521 U.S. at 524. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opin-
ion in which Justice Stevens joined, the purpose of which was to respond to justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion which took the position that historical materials
support a result contrary to the one reached in Smith. Id. Justice Stevens wrote a
separate concurring opinion to the effect that in addition to its other defects,
RFRA is a "law respecting an establishment of religion," that violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 536-37.
159. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (quoting language from RFRA).
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a constitutional right by changing what the right is;'16° (2) the dis-
tinction between the remedying or prevention of unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the gov-
erning law exist and must be observed; 61 (3) giving Congress the
power to change the Constitution would violate the amendment
process contained in Article V;162 (4) "[w]hile preventive rules are
sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a con-
gruence between the means used and the end to be achieved. The
appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light
of the evil presented."
63
Justice Kennedy concluded the Court's opinion with these
words:
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has
acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
embraces the duty to say what the law is ... When the po-
litical branches of the Government, act against the back-
ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution al-
ready issued, it must be understood that in later cases and
controversies the Court will treat it precedents with the re-
spect due them under settled principles, including stare
decisis,6 and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
RFRA [the statute under review], was designed to control
cases and controversies, such as the one before us; but as
the provisions of federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not
[the statute] which must control. 65
Under Flores, it would have been logical for the seven member
majority in Dickerson to find that in § 3501 Congress changed the
160. Id. at 519.
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id. at 529.
163. Id. at 530. In a perfect example of a court recognizing that it has uncon-
stitutionally exceeded its authority, see Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-3917EM,
2000 WL 1182813 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000) (recognizing that its Rule providing
that unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Art. III
because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the
"judicial").
164. Supra notes 103, 113-14, 118, 120, 126, 128, 152 and accompanying text.
165. F/ores, 521 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor said that she
would have joined in the Court's opinion, had she not disagreed with the stan-
dard of Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which
Congress had attempted to overrule by the statute under consideration. Id. at
545.
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rights of the accused, rather than "remedied" a wrong, which was,
in effect, an attempt to amend the Constitution. Furthermore,
even if it could be found that Congress attempted to merely to
remedy a wrong there was no "congruence" between that wrong
and its remedy.
Moreover, regardless of Flores, it would seem that any propo-
nent of Miranda could argue that in Dickerson v. United States the
Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of Con-
gressional attempts to modify one of its former decisions, is simply
following the dictates of Marbury v. Madison.1 6' The seven member
majority, however, agreeing to an almost cryptic opinion by the
Chief Justice, and not expanding upon it by concurring opinions,
indicated a complete lack of interest in constitutional erudition.
4. Does Federalism Play Any Part In This Decision?
The Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity has described federalism in the following words:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm
of authority left open to them under the constitution, the
States must be equally free to engage in any activity that
their courts choose for the common weal, no matter how
unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else including the ju-
diciary deems state involvement to be.i
166. It should not be forgotten that in United States v. Lopez, the Gun-Free
School Zones Act (18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1) (A) (1988 ed. Supp. V)), was held un-
constitutional by the same five member majority which I think will invalidate §
3501 on the ground that any connection between the wrong to be remedied
(guns in schools), and the asserted authority for the remedy (the Commerce
Clause) was tenuous at best. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The same four member minor-
ity dissented. Id.
167. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. This begs the question, not addressed in this pa-
per, as to whether Congress has the power to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court
to make its Miranda rulings in the first place. Erwin Chemerinsky pointed out
that in response to Miranda
[a] Senate proposal would have denied the Supreme Court or any lower
federal court the authority 'to review or reverse, vacate, modify, or dis-
turb in any way, a rule of any trial court of any State in any criminal
prosecution admitting into evidence as voluntarily made an admission or
confession of any accused.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.9 (1997).
See also supra text accompanying notes 146-52 (concerning Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting the rights of federal courts to the States in the matter of criminal
law procedure).
168. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The decision overruled National League of Cities v.
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Federalism provides that the states are free to follow their own
dictates as to what is proper governance, unless that action is for-
bidden by the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment has par-
ticular relevance in connection with that constitutional limitation.
The Court, in Malloy v. Hogan,'69 determined that the states are
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment from promulgating any
170laws which would require an accused to incriminate himself.
The Court in Dickerson should have determined what, if any,
effect Printz v. United States7 has upon the above analysis. The is-
172sue in Printz was whether the Brady Act was constitutional. Two
state law enforcement officers challenged the Act on the grounds
that they were being improperly pressed into the administration ofS 173
a federally enacted regulatory scheme. The statute was held un-
constitutional in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, for himself,
the Chief Justice (Rehnquist), Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Thomas. 74 The so-called "liberal" wing, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Souter, and Stevens, dissented.
1 75
Finding "no constitutional text speaking to this precise ques-
tion," the majority opinion relied on "historical understanding and
practice," "the structure of the constitution" and "the jurispru-
dence of this Court."176 From these sources, Justice Scalia found
that the Brady Act unconstitutionally "commandeered" state offi-
cials to carry out a federal statute and hence violated federalism.
He said that "Testa177 stands for the proposition that state courts
cannot refuse to apply federal law-a conclusion mandated by the
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
169. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
170. Id. The Court said: "[w]e hold today that the Fifth Amendment's excep-
tion from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgement by the States." Id. at 7.
171. 521 U.S. 898 (1997), also known as Mack v. United States.
172. Pub. L. 103-159, as amended, Pub. L. 103-322, 103 Stat. 2074, which
amended § 922 of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), 18 U.S.C. § 921.
173. The Brady Act required the Attorney General to establish a national in-
stant background check system by November 30, 1998, and immediately put into
place interim provisions until that system became operative. The chief law en-
forcement officers of the states were required to take certain steps to promulgate
the federal statute, which contained criminal penalties for its violation.
174. Justices O'Connor and Thomas wrote concurring opinions.
175. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Breyer, Gins-
burg and Souter joined. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which Jus-
tice Stevens joined andJustice Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
176. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
177. Referring to Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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terms of the Supremacy Clause ... that says nothing about whether
state executive officers must administer federal law.'
178
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Breyer, Gins-
burg, and Souter, wrote:
There is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph in the entire
text of the Constitution of the United States that supports
the proposition that a local police officer can ignore a
command contained in a statute enacted by congress pur-
suant to an express delegation of power enumerated in
Article I.
171
Does the statute considered here have the same constitutional
deficiencies as the Brady Act? If it does, Printz should apply; if it
does not, Printz should be distinguished.I0  Arguments can be
made on both sides of the question. The statute does not require
State police officers to give the Miranda warnings; in fact by its
terms it applies only to the United States and the United States
Territory of the Virgin Islands. Even if the statute does apply to the
States, the arguments made by the four "liberal" members in Printz
support a finding of no constitutional violation. Striking down a
statute without any reference to federalism is curious, to say the
least.
At least one commentator has strenuously argued that federal-
ism "undermines" Miranda."" His thesis is twofold. First, Miranda,
by applying to state as well as federal police officers, invades an
area of traditional state concern. "[T]he Constitution has not
granted our federal government, a government of only enumer-
ated powers, the right to impose such an obligation on the
states."18 2 Second, "[t]he plain language of Printz states that the
178. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
179. Id. at 944. He added, that "not only the constitution, but every law en-
acted by Congress as well, establishes policy for the states just as firmly as do laws
enacted by state legislatures." Id.
180. The whole concept of federalism is taken apart and denigrated by Profes-
sors Adler and Kreimer. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Eti-
quette of Federalism: New York, Printz and Yesky, Sup. CT. REv. 71 (1998). They sub-
mit that the Supreme Court sees state autonomy as a "fundamental, constitutional
value" and that it has developed that proposition in three recent cases: Pennsyl-
vania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey: 524 U.S. 206 (1998); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Whether or
not the authors are correct, there is sufficient doubt about the subject as to re-
quire a clarification by the Court.
181. Michael D. Hatcher, Printz Policy: Federalism Undermines Miranda, 88 GEO.
L.J. 177 (1999).
182. Id. at 181.
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'federal government' cannot compel state executive officials to
administer federal regulatory programs .... The Court did not limit
its holding to Congress and exclude itself absent a constitutionalS. • ,,1 83
violation., In his opinion, Miranda commandeers state executive
officials, just as in Printz the federal statute commandeered state of-
ficials. Mr. Hatcher wrote:
Miranda sweeps broader than the Fifth Amendment, and
in so doing, cannot be said to squarely protect a constitu-
tional right. Because the Miranda warnings are not re-
quired by the Constitution, they constitute a federal regu-
latory prescription that commandeers state police officers
engaged in their duties of investigation of criminal con-
duct. The plain language and reasoning of Printz demon-
strate that Miranda's dictates to state police officers are no
different from the congressional mandates at issue in
Printz.'"
Thus, it would seem that federalism would have offered Justices
Scalia and Thomas a cudgel with which to hammer Miranda; yet
the dissenting opinion does not mention it per se.
On the other hand, it would seem that the majority in
Dickerson had a perfect opportunity to harmonize Miranda and fed-
eralism, but chose not to discuss the point. It could have been the
position of the Court that Miranda simply promulgated rules of
conduct, not edicts of constitutional law. It is true that the Miranda
Court said that its decision in Malloy v. Hogan s5 "necessitates an ex-
amination of the scope of the privilege in state cases as well" as in186
federal cases. It is also true that the Court said that "unless we
are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in appriz-
ing accused persons of their rights of silence and in assuring a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards [refer-
ring to the rule promulgated], must be observed." 8 In between
those statements, however, was as conciliatory language as one can
envision:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives
for protecting the privilege which might be devised by
Congress or the states in the exercise of their creative
183. Id. at 200.
184. Id. at 205. Unanswered, however, is by what authority are states con-
trolled if Miranda's warnings are not "required by the Constitution?"
185. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
186. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966).
187. Id. at 467.
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rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the
constitution necessarily requires adherence to any par-
ticular solution for the inherent compulsions of the inter-
rogation process as it is presently conducted. Our deci-
sion in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, not is it intended to
have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective
ways of protecting the rights of the individual while pro-
188
moting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.
The Dickerson majority could easily have taken the position that
had the Court wanted to impose its will on the states it would have
used more imperative language than that quoted above. It would
not have merely devised "prophylactic" rules seeking to safeguard
the Constitution. It would have promulgated a constitutional edict
that all courts, state and federal, would be required to follow, and
moreover, that Congress could not change. Finding that Miranda
did not violate federalism is harmonious with those cases which say
that unless a constitutional violation is involved, the federal courts
will not impose federal criminal law on the states, a thesis espoused
in Dickerson. In Smith v. Phillips,19° Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice O'Connor, wrote that "[f] ederal courts hold no supervisory
authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to
correct wrongs of constitutional dimension."191 Justices Ginsburg,
Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Stevens have acknowledged this prin-
ciple of law.' 92 The Court could not, however, take the position
188. Id.
189. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
190. 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982).
191. Rehnquist's majority opinions in MuMin v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422
(1991), and in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995). HejoinedJus-
tice Powell's opinion in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986), which stated:
"[t]he right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of
the sovereignty retained by the States." SeeJustice O'Connor's opinion in Heath v.
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985) (stating that "[i]t is axiomatic that '[i]n America,
the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union and
those of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects commit-
ted to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the
other."). See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986); Victor v. Nebraska,
511 U.S. 1, 17 (1986). Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell's opinion in Kelly,
479 U.S. at 47, to the same effect.
192. Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Victor, 511 U.S. at 27 (stating
that "I recognize that this Court has no supervisory powers over the state courts.");
see alsoJustice Kennedy's concurrence with Justice O'Connor's opinion, which ac-
knowledged the "limited power of federal habeas." Id. Justices Scalia and Souter
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that Miranda did not violate federalism, without finding that the
1966 decision was a constitutional one. 193 Having made that find-
ing, it is curious that the Court did not discuss federalism.
5. Does The Supremacy Clause Play A Part In This Decision?
The Supremacy Clause provides, in pertinent part, that:
This constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'
94
In Testa v. Katt,'95 the Supreme Court laid down a basic princi-
ple to the effect that state courts of appropriate jurisdiction gener-
ally may not decline to entertain a federal claim when they are re-
quired to do so by federal statute. This proposition was based on
the theory that when Congress enacts a federal statute it speaks for
all the people and all the states, just as though the statute had been• , 196
enacted by the state legislatures.
The Supremacy Clause may have been applied to invalidate
3501 if the majority had followed the rationale of Alden v. Maine.9
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, and Justice Souter's dissent in
that case constitute a virtual textbook on the Supremacy Clause.
The five-to-four judgment of the Court' " was that the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution bars an individual suit against a state to
enforce a federal statutory right under the Fair Labor Standards
joined in Rehnquist's opinion in Mu'Min. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 422. Justice Ste-
vens joined Justice Marshall's dissent in Phillips, 455 U.S. at 243, and in
O'Connor's opinion in Heath, 474 U.S. at 9, both of which referred to the same
rule of law.
193. Perhaps in this instance Justice Scalia is wrong in saying that "a majority
of the Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the lesser evil."
Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2343.
194. U. S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
195. 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947).
196. This was a principle announced by the Court in 1912 in Mondou v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford PRP Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
197. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
198. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, while Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Ste-
vens were in the minority. Id. I had predicted that the ruling of the Court in
Dickerson would have been the same five-to-four split for holding the statute un-
constitutional, but for entirely different reasons than asserted by the seven mem-
ber majority.
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Act of 1938, (FLSA),' 9 when brought in a state's court over the
state's objection. Justice Kennedy wrote:
As is evident from its text ... the Supremacy Clause en-
shrines as the supreme law of the land only those federal
Acts that accord with the constitutional design. Appeal to
the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises the question
whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power.
But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the
larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional
powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authori-
ties of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law
of the land.2 °
The Supremacy Clause does impose specific obligations on
state judges. There can be no serious contention, however, that
the Supremacy Clause imposes greater obligations on state-court
judges than on the Judiciary of the United States itself.
21
That we have, during the first 210 years of our constitutional
history found it unnecessary to decide the question presented here
suggests a federal power to subject non-consenting States to private
suits in their own courts is unnecessary to uphold the Constitution
202
and valid federal statutes as the supreme law.
Alden established that its five member majority believed that
the Supremacy Clause has its limitations. Only those "Laws"203 that
accord with the "constitutional design" rise to the level of being
"supreme." Applying that principle to the present case, it would
not have been illogical for the majority to see § 3501 as not being
in accord with any "constitutional design" within the meaning of
that term as used in Alden.2° If it had taken such a micro step, it
would have saved itself the difficulty of converting a prophylactic
rule into a constitutional one. The Court could have found that
Congress enacted the statute in an attempt to overrule a case
(Miranda), that by its own words, did not seek to interpret the Con-
stitution, but which established a mere construct of proper proce-
dures in order to meet constitutional demands.
Justice Souter, writing for the four member minority in Alden
said that a flaw in the majority's position is its reliance upon feder-
199. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994 & Supp. III).
200. Alden, 527 U.S. at 751 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 755.
202. Id. at 758.
203. Referred to in the case as "Acts." Id. at 751.
204. Supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
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alism. 2°- He elucidated:
The State of Maine is not sovereign with respect to the na-
tional objective of the FLSA [the statute in question]. It is
not the authority that promulgated the FLSA on which
the right of action in this case depends. That authority is
the United States acting through the Congress, whose leg-
islative power under Article I of the Constitution to ex-
tend FLSA coverage to state employees has already been
decided [in a prior decision of the Court] .
Maine has created state courts of general jurisdiction; once it
has done so the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution Art. VI, cl. 2
which requires state courts to enforce federal law and state-court
judges to be bound by it, requires the Maine courts to entertain
this federal cause of action. 20' A subsidiary question arose in
Dickerson; i.e. does the Supremacy Clause apply where Congress has
specifically limited the application of a statute to federal cases?20
8
The Court ignored this question, though its members have written
about it in the past. Justice O'Connor writing the opinion of the
Court in Tafflin v. Levitt,2°9 noted that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts over federal causes of action unless
Congress gives that jurisdiction exclusively to the federal courts, or
there is a "clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction
and federal interests. 2 10 The Court in Tafflin found no intent on
the part of Congress to limit RICO civil suits to federal courts, even
211though the statute in question, provided for civil actions "in any
appropriate United States district court." She added that "the mere
grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a
state court from concurrent jurisdiction of a cause of action., 212 A
205. Justice Souter said that the same five member majority made a mistake in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996), in holding that the Elev-
enth Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of
being sued in Federal court.
206. Alden, 527 U.S. at 800.
207. Id. at 801.
208. It will be recalled that § 3501 uses the wording "[i]n any criminal prose-
cution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia." 18 U.S.C. §
3501 (a) (2000).
209. 493 U.S. 455 (1990). This was a unanimous opinion, hence all of the
present Justices joined in it, exceptJustices Breyer and Ginsburg. Id.
210. Id. at 459-60.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(2000).
212. Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 461.
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natural extrapolation of that theory for the entire Court2 to have
made is that if Congress intended to restrict § 3501 to the federal
and District of Columbia jurisdictions that limitation would apply.
While there may be no "clear incompatibility between state court
jurisdiction and federal interests," the jurisdictional limitation ap-
pears in clear and unequivocal language. 4
The Court could have decided that even if Congress had the
authority to enact § 3501, and it is not unconstitutional, § 3501 will
not prevail under the Supremacy Clause, particularly where by its
terms it is limited in application to United States and District of Co-
lumbia courts.
Without specifically mentioning the Supremacy Clause per se,
Justice Scalia raised a Supremacy Clause argument in his dissent.
He said the majority asserted that Miranda must be a "constitu-
tional decision" because the Court, since the case's inception, has
applied it to the States. Discounting that assertion as being able to
invoke stare decisis, he conjectured that perhaps the Court intended
the assertion as "an appeal to logic." As such, he discounted it also:
Congress's attempt to set aside Miranda, since it repre-
sents an assertion that violation of Miranda is not a viola-
tion of the constitution, also represents an assertion that
the Court has no power to impose Miranda on the States.
To answer this assertion-not by showing why violation of
Miranda is a violation of the constitution-but by asserting
that Miranda does apply against the States, is to assume
precisely the point at issue. In my view, our continued
application of the Miranda code to the States despite our
consistent statements that running afoul of its dictates
does not necessarily-or even usually-result in an actual
constitutional violation, represents not the source of
Miranda's salvation but rather evidence of its ultimate il-
legitimacy. 215
The Court has held that the Supremacy Clause applies only to
Congressional Acts and the functions of an agency "acting pursu-
213. It must be remembered that all of the present Justices, except Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg agreed with Justice O'Connor in Tafflin. See also supra note
148.
214. Section 3501 was enacted pursuant to Congress' "power to prescribe rules
of evidence in Federal courts," and the authority to enact implicitly authorizes the
establishment of limits of application. S. COMM. REP., reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2137.
215. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
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ant to congressional delegation. " 1 6  The Supreme Court in
Miranda did not designate the courts which were to follow its dic-
tates. The state courts, as well as federal tribunals have done so.
The majority in Dickerson assigns this state adoption of the Miranda
rules as a reason why the Miranda rules are constitutional,1 8 i.e., the
219Court could not impose "nonconstitutional" rules on the States., . . ,,220
If the Miranda rules are "nonconstitutiona , they would not be
enforceable against the States, even though the States might opt tothm221
use them. The Court was presented with a perfect opportunity to
discuss whether the rule announced in Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Medical Laboratories, Inc.222 is good law. Why could a valid ar-
gument not be made that an apt extension of Testa dictates that
when the Supreme Court speaks, unless it restricts the application
of its ruling, it speaks for all the people and all the states, makingca -224
Miranda the governing "law" under the Supremacy Clause? Two
recent pronouncements of Justices Scalia and Stevens on the Su-
premacy Clause demand clarification. Justice Scalia, concurring in
Tafflin v. Levitt,225 wrote that the reason why state judges enforce
federal law is:
216. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716
(1985). This is the position taken by the U.S. Attorney General in this case. See
Brief for the United States at 24, Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab.,
Inc., available at 2000 WL 141075.
217. Michael D. Hatcher, Printz Policy: Federalism Undermines Miranda, 88 GEO.
L.J. 177, 197 n.172 (Nov. 1999) (listing the State Supreme Court cases in which
Miranda was followed). The United States Supreme Court in reviewing cases from
state courts has opined that Miranda applies. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318, 322 (1994) (per curiam opinion); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153
(1990) (opinion by Kennedy). The Court also has acknowledged that Miranda
applies when federal courts exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over state courts.
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) (opinion by Stevens); Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 680 (1993) (opinion by Souter).
218. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2326.
219. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797-99 (1975).
220. Supra text accompanying notes 28-70.
221. In Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 270 (2000), the five member majority
there (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas), as I had predicted here, held that under the concept of federalism the
Supreme Court is not allowed to impose a "straitjacket" on the State. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (citing the Court's admonition against "strait-
jackets").
222. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
223. Testav. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
224. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (stating the United States is
the "paramount sovereignty").
225. 493 U.S. 455, 469 (1990).
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PROPHYLACTIC AND YET CONSTITUTIONAL?
[N]ot because ... their inherent power permits them to
entertain transitory causes of action arising under the laws
of foreign sovereigns [but because federal laws] are laws
in the several States, and just as much binding on the citi-
zens and courts thereof as the States laws are .... The two
together form one system of jurisdiction, which consti-
tutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of
226the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Printz,27 said that the Suprem-
acy Clause's mention of judges was nothing more than a choice-of-
law rule. The Supreme Court would have done well to have ex-
panded upon these two pronouncements.
V. CONCLUSION
The most serious criticism that can be lodged against the
Dickerson decision is not that it was a race to judgment in order to
228
save Miranda, but that the reason or reasons for that result are in-
sufficiently developed. The Court gives in essence, only one rea-
son, i.e. since Miranda was a constitutional decision, Congress had
no authority to overrule it. As an additional, or "make-weight "
reason, the Court said, in effect, that regardless of the worth of
Miranda, demanded that it be saved. Rather than address the issue
at hand, i.e., whether a statute is constitutional, the majority opin-
ion attempts tojustify its conclusion that a case should be saved.
From prior pronouncements of most of the seven Justices who
constitute the Dickerson majority, one can only conclude that
Miranda was just an announcement of some "prophylactic" rules,
promulgated to safeguard Fifth Amendment rights. Had those Jus-
tices been consistent in their analysis of what Miranda stood for,
the ruling of this Court would have been that Congress had the
power to enact § 3501. Wanting to save Miranda, however, the
Court would have had to find another ground for striking down
the statute. Saving Miranda through stare decisis alone, would not
have offered a solution to the dilemma, for having a case which
should be preserved, and a valid statute which sought to overturn
it, simultaneously extant, would present a dilemma of monumental
proportions.
226. Id. at 469-70. Justice Scalia, in this passage drew heavily upon the Court's
1876 decision in Claflin. See also supra note 223.
227. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 968 n.31. (1997).
228. Supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
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The Court could have found that § 3501 was the result of an
excess of power on the part of Congress, per City of Boerne v. Flo-229
res. The Court could have found the statute invalid, as violating
federalism, per Printz v. United States.230  The Court could have
found § 3501 invalid under the Supremacy Clause, per the case ofS• 231
Alden v. Maine. Any one of these reasons would have been suffi-
cient ratio decidendi to strike down the statute, even though the case
it sought to abolish lacked constitutional substance.
The Court chose what at first might appear to be the easy
method of salvaging Miranda, i.e., find it to be a "constitutional"
decision. If it were, then surely Congress could not overturn it.
Upon closer analysis, however, the flaw in this approach becomes
patent. What was for years considered nothing more than a deci-
sion announcing a "prophylactic" rule,232 suddenly became one of
constitutional proportions. The Court made no attempt to har-
monize pre-Dickerson Miranda with post-Dickerson Miranda. If there
is a distinction between the two versions of Miranda, the Court
made no attempt to explain how the metamorphosis came about. It
would seem that when the Supreme Court is faced with the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of a statute that seeks to overturn a
prior Supreme Court decision, initially the case must be analyzed
to determine whether it was of such constitutional proportions that
Congress had no authority to overturn it. After that determination
is made the case holds very little significance. The constitutionality
of the statute on its own merits must be determined. Even if Con-
gress were permitted to overturn a case because it was not of consti-
tutional proportions, the statute it passed might itself have been
constitutionally flawed. This was an inquiry with which the Court
did not appear to concern itself. The Court seemed bound and de-
termined to save Miranda, and having found a way satisfactory to
itself, it devoted precious little time to the refinements of constitu-
tional review. The end result of Dickerson, the salvage of Miranda,
may be applauded by some, and condemned by others. The
method of doing so, however, should be condemned by all who
consider constitutional review an exacting science.
229. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
230. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
231. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
232. Supra Part II.
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